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CURBING PREDATORY PRACTICES IN FLORIDA'S
PETROLEUM MARKETING INDUSTRY
J. MICHAEL HUEY,* GEOFFREY B. SCHWARTZ,** and DOUGLAS S.
ROBERTS* * *
I. INTRODUCTION
During the past decade significant changes have occurred in the
marketing of motor fuel in the United States. These changes pri-
marily resulted from the entry of major oil companies into the re-
tail gasoline market. While major oil companies argue that this
change in marketing strategy is in good faith and directly benefits
the motoring public, wholesale marketers and independent retail-
ers have cried "foul" while being displaced in the retail market by
the major refiners. Indeed, the turmoil within the petroleum indus-
try over this issue has resulted in both state and federal govern-
ment involvement. The Florida Legislature first attempted to deal
with this dilemma in 1974 by limiting direct retail marketing by
refiners.' Unenforced for ten years, this law was finally declared
constitutional in 19842 and became the leverage for a second legis-
lative remedy during the 1985 Regular Session-the Motor Fuel
Marketing Practices Act.3
Florida's adoption of this petroleum marketing law, on the heels
of similar actions by Alabama 4 and Georgia,5 underscores the sig-
nificance of this issue. Whether Florida's latest action will elimi-
nate predatory and anticompetitive marketing conduct remains to
be seen. What seems certain, however, is the resolve of the respec-
tive interests in this fight-the refiners, the wholesalers, and the
dealers-to engage in legislative and judicial war to protect or ad-
vance their positions.
*Akerman, Senterfitt & Eidson, Tallahassee, Florida. Florida State University, B.S., 1967,
J.D., 1980.
**Akerman, Senterfitt & Eidson, Tallahassee, Florida. University of Central Florida B.A.
1971; Florida State University M.B.A., J.D., 1980.
***Canditate for the degree Juris Doctor, Florida State University College of Law.
1. FLA. STAT. § 526.151 (1974).
2. State ex rel. Gas Kwick, Inc. v. Connor, 453 So. 2d 863 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984).
3. Ch. 85-74, 1985 Fla. Laws 429.
4. ALA. CODE § 8-22-1 (1984).
5. GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-250 (Supp. 1985).
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II. THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY MARKETING STRUCTURE-PAST AND
PRESENT
The petroleum industry, although viewed differently during the
oil crisis of the 1970's, has generally been perceived to be a stable
industry controlled by a few corporate giants. The general public
has been and continues to be unmindful of the various sectors that
comprise the industry and how these sectors are controlled. Func-
tionally, the petroleum industry is divided into four major interre-
lated sectors: production, refining, transportation, and wholesale-
retail marketing.6
Production, refining, and transportation have historically been
controlled by a very few large, well-known corporations such as Ex-
xon, Chevron, Standard Oil, Mobil, Texaco, Gulf, and Phillips. In
1974, the top eight corporations controlled fifty-four percent of to-
tal U.S. crude oil production, sixty-five percent of all U.S. power
oil reserves, and sixty-four percent of the U.S. crude oil and re-
fined petroleum products transported in pipelines. 7 This oligopolis-
tic trend seems to be continuing as evidenced by Sohio's recent
acquisition of Gulf and other potential acquisitions or takeovers.
Marketing of refined petroleum products at the wholesale and
retail levels has, on the other hand, been highly competitive, in-
volving hundreds of thousands of independent businesses.8 Histori-
cally, the major oil companies left the wholesaling and retailing of
motor fuel to independent businessmen.9 Refined products were
generally sold or consigned to independent wholesalers (referred to
as jobbers) and other consignees, who in turn supplied indepen-
dent retailers and commercial accounts, for example trucking com-
panies and municipalities. The wholesalers and consignees pur-
chased the refined motor fuel at a wholesale price, generally known
as the terminal price, and stored it in their bulk storage facilities
for subsequent sale. These wholesalers or consignees, in turn, sold
most of their gasoline to retailers at a price generally known as the
6. SENATE COMM. ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS, 93D CONG., 1ST SESS., PRELIMINARY
FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N STAFF REPORT 12 (Comm. Print 1973) [hereinafter cited as FTC
STAFF REP.].
7. Comment, State Gasoline Divorcement Statutes: Legal and Economic Implications,
28 CATH. U.L. REV. 511, 515 (1979). Some 10,000 firms operated in this sector in 1973, but
50% of all production was controlled by eight firms. FTC STAFF REPORT at 6. See also The
Industrial Reorganization Act, 1975: Hearings on S.1167 Before the Subcomm. on Anti-
trust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. 461, 465
(1975) (submission of Exxon Co. U.S.A.).
8. FTC STAFF REP., supra note 6, at 6.
9. Id. at 21.
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dealer tankwagon price, plus freight charges and applicable taxes."
Traditionally, wholesalers were the collectors of state and motor
fuel taxes.
Although wholesale and retail marketing of motor fuel was typi-
cally conducted by independent businessmen, they were far from
independent of the control and influence of major producers and
refiners. Each major refiner typically established its own wholesal-
ers or consignees geographically. These consignees received
franchises to sell that refiner's gasoline, oil, and other accessories.
These franchisees were obligated by contract to purchase all of
their gas and oil from the refiner, sell these products under the
refiner's brand, and comply with operational requirements imposed
by the refiner. Similarly, service station dealers supplied by these
"branded" consignees or wholesalers were required to sell only the
refiner's products and to comply with the refiner's operational
requirements."
During the past two decades, while jobbers and consignees con-
tinued to operate under contracts which required them to purchase
minimum quantities of fuel each year, the refiners have begun to
supply some service station dealers directly, thus bypassing the
wholesalers. 12 This dual distribution system has had an adverse
impact on wholesale marketers.1 s While many wholesalers had
been assured that they would be the only distributor of a particu-
lar refiner's motor fuel products within a geographic region, their
contracts, prepared by the refiners, did not expressly preserve this
promise. Most wholesale marketers' economic lives were so closely
tied to their refiner that they had to accept the new dual distribu-
tion system imposed by the refiners.1 4
10. Gasoline Marketing Since Decontrol: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Energy,
Environment, and Safety Issues Affecting Small Business of the House Comm. on Small
Business, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 59, 61 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Gasoline Marketing
Hearings].
11. Comment, supra note 7, at 518-20.
12. J. WILLIAMS, Gasoline: Regulation of Price and Supply, 1, 1-2 (Callaghan Energy
Law Monograph No. 4A, (1978)). See also Gasoline Marketing Hearings, supra note 10, at
266-71 (statement of Robert I. Thornhill, President-Elect, National Oil Jobbers Council).
Jobbers purchase products in bulk at a terminal and either store in it their own storage
facilities for later distribution or transport it directly to a retail outlet or other customers.
Jobbers profit through the distribution charge and other services they provide retailers,
items which constitute the jobber margin. Id. at 266. In 1980, jobbers handled more than
48% of the gasoline products moving to the retail market, which represented a 15% growth
in such movements. This includes sales made to retail service stations owned by jobbers. Id.
at 605.
13. Comment, supra note 7, at 521-22.
14. See id.
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Fortunately, the wholesale marketer was allowed to purchase at
wholesale price (posted terminal price) which was lower than the
price at which the refiner sold to his directly supplied dealers (the
dealer tankwagon price). Therefore, jobbers and consignees could
also continue to supply dealers at prices which were relatively com-
petitive with those given refiner-supplied dealers. Of course, the
opportunity for continued growth by jobbers and consignees was
severely hampered as refiners generally chose to directly supply
the most favorably located, higher volume, service stations.
While gasoline produced by major refiners (majors) typically has
been marketed through the independent wholesale-retail network,
this is not the case for some of the midsize and smaller refiners
(mini-majors) comprising the remaining top twenty firms in the in-
dustry.16 Many of these refiners elected years ago to retail their
gasoline through their own company-operated stations.17 Lacking
the name recognition of the majors, the mini-majors competed by
offering lower prices and fewer customer services.1 8 Their profits
were built through volume sales rather than the higher profit mar-
gins enjoyed by the majors.'9
Drastic price increases resulting from oil embargoes, greater re-
tail competition from the mini-majors, and nationwide acceptance
of self-serve gasoline have resulted in substantial changes in gaso-
line retailing since the 1970's. The majors have moved toward a
third marketing system in which they market refined products
through company-operated stations that are primarily self-serve
with no automotive repair services. These directly-operated outlets
have been opened in competition with jobbers supplied by the ma-
jors and dealers purchasing from these jobbers, as well as with re-
finer-supplied dealers.20 This has occurred even though the jobbers
and the refiner-supplied dealers continue to have minimum
purchase requirements imposed upon them by their refiners and
regardless of the fact that their refiners and suppliers are compet-
ing in the same market with them.
Wholesalers, further bypassed under this marketing strategy,
15. Id. at 519.
16. FTC STAFF REP., supra note 6, at 21-23. The top eight firms in gasoline sales are the
same as the top eight in crude oil production and in refinery capacity. Id. at 22.
17. FTC STAFF REP., supra note 6, at 23.
18. Id.
19. Comment, supra note 7, at 519. Mini-majors "have established their own network of
retail stations to utilize fully their refinery capacity, and they augment their refining income
through high volume gasoline sales" at company-operated stations. Id.
20. J. WILLUAMS, supra note 12, at 2.
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have diminished in number, except those wholesalers who have be-
come chain retailers, owning and operating self-service stations
and convenience stores. The number of dealers has also dwindled.
Due to the separation of motor fuel sales from automobile service,
these dealers are unable to compete with their supplier and the
mini-majors, who operate with a lower overhead. 1
According to wholesalers and retailers, existing state and federal
regulation has been only partially successful in preventing abuses
by refiners in the marketing of motor fuel.22 Vertical integration by
refiners may not be, per se, harmful but it has had a deleterious
effect. Refiners have evidently used production and refining profits
to subsidize their marketing efforts at their directly operated out-
lets and at some of their directly-supplied dealers' outlets. Jobbers
and dealers have been placed in a cost-price squeeze that they in-
terpret as an attempt to drive them out of the more lucrative retail
markets.2 3 Among the predatory refiner practices claimed by job-
bers and dealers are:
1. Below cost selling at retail by majors and mini-majors;
2. Refiners raising prices to jobbers while holding down prices
to company-operated retail locations and directly-supplied
dealers;
3. Refiners imposing annual minimum purchase requirements
on jobbers while not imposing such requirements on company-op-
erated stations or directly-supplied dealers;
4. Refiners imposing restrictions or allocations on the motor
fuel which jobbers may purchase, while no such restrictions or al-
locations are imposed on the company-operated stationi or on di-
rectly supplied dealers;
21. STAFF REPORT OF PA. Gov.'s ENERGY COUNCIL, GASOLINE MARKETING: TRENDS AND
CHOICES (1982), reprinted in Gasoline Marketing Hearings, supra note 10, at 568-92. Inde-
pendent dealer-operated stations dropped from 204,146 to 98,804 between 1972 and 1980
nationally-a 50% drop. As a percentage of the market, lessee dealer stations dropped from
37% to 24%. Id.
22. Gasoline Marketing Hearings, supra note 10, at 35 (testimony of Vic Rasheed, Exec.
Director, Service Station Dealers of Am.). See also id. at 200 (testimony of Jack R. Findlay,
Pres., Cal. Arco Distribs., Inc.); id. (testimony of Jack A. Blum, Counsel, Indep. Gasoline
Marketers Council).
23. See R. CALLMAN, UNFAIR COMPETrOIN, TRADEMARKS & MONOPOLIES (4th Ed. 1981) for
a discussion of various types of unfair competitive practices. Included within the scope of
predatory practices are sales below cost, price and supply discrimination, attempts at mo-
nopolization, and interference with a competitor's customers.
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5. Increased restrictions on credit extended by refiners to job-
bers and independent dealers;
6. Rack pricing by refiners which eliminates the jobbers' tradi-
tional functional margin (the difference between the price paid by
jobbers for motor fuel at wholesale and the price paid by directly-
supplied dealers);
7. Increased sales by refiners to commercial account customers
at prices below jobber cost;
8. Volume rebates, rent reductions, and other allowances pro-
vided to refiner-supplied dealers but not provided to competing
jobbers;
9. The refiner's use of superior bargaining power to force deal-
ers to submit to terms in station leases and supply contracts
which are not in the dealers' best interests, such as hours of oper-
ation, maintenance requirement, and forced conversion to self-
service and convenience stores;
10. Unprecedented rent increases imposed upon dealers by
refiners.2 4
Refiners respond that their actions are not predatory or discrim-
inatory. They argue that the current changes in petroleum market-
ing are the result of recent decontrol of petroleum prices and allo-
cations, decreased consumer demand for motor fuel, and general
economics.2 5 In this situation, refiners say, the inefficient marketers
will have to streamline their operations or discontinue business.
24. Gasoline Marketing Hearings, supra note 10, at 268-269 (statement of R.J. Thorn-
hill, President-Elect, National Oil Jobbers Council). The complaints were a summary of re-
sponses from jobbers and jobber associations across the country. See id. at 290-412 (compil-
ing letters from various state jobber associations listing predatory practices engaged in by
refiners to the detriment of their members). The jobber margin was estimated to have de-
clined 44% in the 18 month period beginning in January 1981. Jobber-dealer spread off
44% in 18 mos., OIL EXPRESS, October 4, 1982, at 1, reprinted in Gasoline Marketing Hear-
ings, supra note 10, at 283. Not all refiners were accused of all of these practices, although
each major refiner was seen as engaging in one or more of the practices. Gasoline Marketing
Hearings, supra note 10, at 269.
Other complained of conditions included imposition of prescribed pricing policies, mar-
keting of refiner automotive parts; tires, batteries, and accessories (TBA); and minimum
volume sales. F. ALLVINE, J. HOUSTON, & 0. PHILLIPS, THE CASE FOR LEGISLATIVE RELIEF FROM
THE IMPENDING DESTRUCTION OF SMALL BUSINESS AND COMPETITION IN THE GASOLINE INDUS-
TRY (1980), reprinted in Gasoline Marketing Hearings, supra note 10, at 70.
25. Gasoline Marketing Hearings, supra note 10, at 477 (testimony of Ellis W. Gunnels,
Vice President of Marketing, Texaco, U.S.A.).
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Majors suggest that price structures for directly-supplied dealers
and for jobbers are unrelated to each other and, therefore, that the
equalization of prices to these two groups is fair. They maintain
that prices to jobbers and dealers are set independently of one an-
other, based upon current market conditions.2 6
Majors also argue that the maximum monthly or annual supply
limits placed upon jobbers permit the refiner to supply all custom-
ers more efficiently and to avoid periodic shortages.27 The majors
defend, as a necessary competitive practice, volume rebates and
sales-boosting incentives to directly-supplied and company-oper-
ated stations .2  They disclaim any solicitation of independent deal-
ers and commercial accounts but consider these accounts a totally
different "class of trade" for which they maintain the right to re-
spond to requests for direct refiner sales.29
The majors further contend that recent rent increases are not
exorbitant 0 and that contract terms are not forced on dealers.31
They and the mini-majors defend their operation of company-
owned stations and contend that any sales at those stations made
below the motor fuel cost paid by dealers are the result of higher
26. Id. at 483. See also id. at 511 (testimony of R.C. Kiddoo, Vice President of Market-
ing, Exxon Co., U.S.A.). "[S]ince distributor and dealer prices vary as a result of somewhat
different competitive pressures, there is no fixed relationship between the two." Id. The
major refiners point to the few jobber bankruptcies as evidence that jobbers are not preyed
upon by their suppliers. See id. at 515-16.
27. Id. at 484. Refiners also point to the fact that jobbers generally are taking average
monthly quantities well under their maximum allocation. Texaco reports that a typical job-
ber draws 82 to 87% of their maximum monthly allocation. Id.
28. Id. at 493. (Prepared statement of R. C. Kiddoo, Vice President of Marketing, Exxon
Co., U.S.A.). For example, in 1982, Texaco offered an incentive rebate that worked as fol-
lows: On monthly sales up to 50% of a predetermined base period amount, a 0 cent-per-
gallon discount; on monthly sales between 50% and 100% of the base period amount, 4
cent-per-gallon discount from the refiner; and on sales over 100% of the base period amount
a 5/2 cent-per-gallon discount, for a price equal to the price charged to a jobber. Thus, a
station that sold 100% of its base period amount received an average 2 cent-per-gallon dis-
count on products supplied by the refiner. On all sales over 100% of the base period
amount, the dealer purchased products delivered from the refiner for the same price as that
which the jobber paid to pick up the product at the terminal. Id. at 479 (testimony of Ellis
Gunnells, Texaco, U.S.A.).
29. Id. at 518 (prepared statement of R. C. Kiddoo, Vice President of Marketing, Exxon
Co., U.S.A.).
30. Id. at 516.
31. Id. at 519-20. Exxon maintains that its annual rent increases have averaged 8% per
year, with a recent spurt following petroleum price decontrol to compensate for artificially
low rents. Refiners also point to the federal Petroleum Marketing Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §
2801 (1982), as providing dealers with protection from unreasonable franchise or lease
terms. Id. at 505 (testimony of W.J. Bittles, Jr., Vice President of Sales, Shell Oil Co.).
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volumes 2 or market competition," and not a result of subsidiza-
tion of marketing operations by other segments of the firm's
operations.3"
III. FEDERAL AND STATE RESPONSES TO PREDATORY MARKETING
PRACTICES
The predatory or anticompetitive conduct allegedly occurring in
petroleum marketing today is similar to conduct in other indus-
tries in the past century. A variety of measures have been taken by
states and the federal government designed to curb such conduct
and to insure a viable and competitive market. These measures
have varied from general efforts, like antitrust and unfair sales acts
which cover all products and industries, to laws designed to cure
problems with specific industries or products, such as alcohol,
milk, or petroleum.
A. Antitrust Laws: Effect on Predatory Practices
Beginning in the late 1800's, federal and state antitrust laws
were created to curb anticompetitive practices in the free market.
The federal antitrust framework is found in three statutes: (1) the
Sherman Act,15 with its emphasis on monopolies and combinations
in restraint of trade; (2) the Clayton Act, 6 as amended by the
Robinson-Patman Act,3 7 emphasizing price discrimination and cer-
tain other exclusionary practices; and (3) the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act, 8 which controls unfair methods of competition and
unfair and deceptive business practices. Of these, the Clayton Act
and the Robinson-Patman Act specifically detail proscribed prac-
tices; the other statutes are less specific, allowing the courts and
the Federal Trade Commission (F.T.C.) to establish broad guide-
lines by which they judge the legality vel non of particular actions.
The federal policy underlying the antitrust laws reflects both ec-
onomic and noneconomic goals, as can be seen from the oft-quoted
statement of Mr. Justice Black in Northern Pacific Railway Co. v.
United States:3 9
32. Id. at 493.
33. Id. at 499.
34. Id. at 514.
35. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982).
36. Id. §§ 12-14, 19-22; 29 U.S.C. §§ 52-53 (1982).
37. 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-13b, 21a (1982).
38. Id. § 45 (1982).
39. 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
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The Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter
of economic liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered com-
petition as the rule of trade. It rests on the premise that the unre-
strained interaction of competitive forces will yield the best allo-
cation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest
quality and the greatest material progress, while at the same time
providing an environment conducive to the preservation of our
democratic political and social institutions.0
Among antitrust scholars there is no general agreement on how to
best achieve these goals. 1
In addition to federal statutes, most states have enacted anti-
trust laws which are patterned after the Sherman Act. These stat-
utes provide a basis for state enforcement where the federal gov-
ernment declines to take action or where the activity is beyond the
reach of federal statutes because it involves intrastate rather than
interstate commerce. 2
To accomplish its objectives, Congress has provided that en-
forcement actions under the Sherman Act may be brought by the
Department of Justice or by private parties; actions under Section
5 of the F.T.C. Act may be brought by the F.T.C.; and actions
under the Clayton Act (including Section 2 of the Robinson-Pat-
man Act) may be brought by any of the three.43 The key element
of the private civil action is the availability of treble damages and
attorney's fees to the successful plaintiff."
40. Id. at 4.
41. There are two schools of economic thought as to the proper antitrust approach: the
"Harvard (Structuralist) School" of economic theory and the "Chicago (Neoclassical)
School." The Harvard School emphasizes market structure and barriers to market entry as
determinants of effective competition. Its members regard industry concentration of mar-
kets as particularly harmful to the competitive process and advocate government interven-
tion to prevent concentration and to deconcentrate those markets already concentrated. The
Chicago School, in general, opposes government intervention. Its members believe that the
free market will ultimately determine the most efficient market structure, thereby benefiting
consumer welfare. They believe that the absence of government intervention will promote
the efficient allocation of resources, and that the most efficient firms will survive by produc-
ing the most desired goods at reasonable prices. See generally Posner, The Chicago School
of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 925 (1979).
42. Florida's antitrust laws were substantially revised in 1980. The Florida Antitrust Act
of 1980 is patterned after the Sherman Act in prohibiting unreasonable restraints of trade
and unlawful monopolies. See FLA. STAT. ch. 542 (1983).
43. See supra notes 35-38. It is beyond the scope of this Article to describe in detail the
full panoply of available public and private remedies. Specifically, the Department of Jus-
tice can bring a criminal action or a civil action for damages and injunctive relief, while
private parties may bring a civil action for damages and injunctive relief.
44. 15 U.S.C.§ 15a (1982).
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From their inception, federal antitrust laws have been an impor-
tant check on the more pronounced anticompetitive practices in
the marketing of motor fuel.45 For example, courts have long held
that predatory pricing violates the antitrust laws when used in a
systematic manner to destroy competition.46 The most prevalent
form of predatory pricing manifests itself in below cost selling. The
objective is not to promote healthy competitive pricing but is to
impose losses on other firms, to drive them out of the market, and
to allow the predator to establish monopolistic prices.4
Although predatory pricing clearly violates the antitrust laws,
how to define and prove predatory pricing is far from clear. This
has been the major impediment to using the federal antitrust laws
to stop below cost selling in the petroleum industry.4' Judicial for-
mulations of the predatory pricing concept often turn on the inher-
ently vague test of "intent". To prevail, a plaintiff must show that
the alleged predator "desires" that its pricing practices injure its
competitors. 49 This is an extremely difficult burden for the plain-
tiff. Further, courts have been reluctant to find that a low price is a
predatory price and is not the result of vigorous price competition
in the market, even when the "vigorous price competition" forces
competitors out of business.50
The proof of predatory intent has been made somewhat easier
by substituting an objective standard for the subjective one of
"motive." To establish the intent element, the plaintiff must prove
45. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911) (predatory pricing is a violation
of § 2 of the Sherman Act, which prohibits attempts to monopolize).
46. Predatory pricing violates: (1) section 2 of the Sherman Act when there is an at-
tempt to monopolize, see Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 43; (2) § 2 of the Clayton Act when the
conduct includes price discrimination, see Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread Co., 348 U.S. 115
(1954); and (3) § 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act under any circumstances. The issues with
regard to predatory pricing are the same under all these provisions. Williamson, Predatory
Pricing: A Strategic and Welfare Analysis, 87 YALE L.J. 284, 284 n.1 (1977).
47. See P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS: PROBLEMS, TEXT AND CASES 11 214(b), 605 (2d
ed. 1981).
48. Malcolm v. Marathon Oil Co., 642 F.2d 845, 853 (5th Cir. 1981); L. SULLIVAN, HAND-
BOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 111 (1977).
49. International Air Indus. v. American Excelsior Co., 517 F.2d 714, 722 (5th Cir. 1975)
(the term "predatory intent" is troublesome; it has never been clearly defined). See also
Pacific Eng'g & Prod. Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 551 F.2d 790, 795 (10th Cir. 1977) (the use
of the term "predatory" to describe an antitrust violation has left much to be desired).
50. Richter Concrete Corp. v. Hilltop Concrete Corp., 691 F.2d 816, 826 (6th Cir. 1982);
Northeastern Tel. Co. v. American Tel. & Tel., 651 F.2d 76, 88 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
455 U.S. 943 (1982); Janich Bros., v. American Distilling Co., 570 F.?d 848, 855 (9th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 829 (1978) ("It is the very nature of competition that the vigor-
ous efficient firms will drive out less efficient firms.").
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that the defendant was selling below cost on a regular basis. By
making this prima facie case, the plaintiff shifts the burden to the
defendant to either refute the proof of "cost" or to justify its be-
havior as a response to competitive market pressures.5 1 This objec-
tive standard has not eliminated the problem of proving intent,
since much confusion remains over the definition of "cost." A
growing number of antitrust scholars and courts have adopted a
strictly economic test to measure cost. Since it is difficult to get
two economists to agree on anything, it is not surprising that
courts are split on which of several cost formulations to use.52 Al-
though the economists' definitions of "marginal costs," "average
variable cost," and "average total cost" are susceptible to explana-
tion and understanding in the classroom, it has been extremely dif-
ficult and ruinously expensive to quantify these costs in the court-
room. This is probably the single largest obstacle facing a plaintiff
attempting to prove a predatory pricing claim under federal law.
The antitrust laws have been frequently used to halt discrimina-
tory pricing practices in the petroleum market.53 The antitrust
prohibitions against certain types of price discrimination have
been an important curb on the more egregious of the abusive prac-
tices in motor fuel marketing. However, their current effectiveness
has been lessened by new marketing methods used by refiners and
by problems of proving competitive injury. For example, under the
Robinson-Patman Act there is no violation unless the discrimina-
tion involves sales to competing buyers who purchase from the
same seller." This does not cover two types of practices perceived
51. See supra notes 48-49.
52.. For a concise discussion of the literature and case law surrounding the complex no-
tion of cost determinations, see A.B.A_ ANTITRusT SECTION, ANTrrrusT LAW DEVELOPMENTS
126-29 (2d ed. 1984). The debate among economic and legal scholars regarding the proper
cost model to use is also extensively discussed in William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT
Continental Baking Co., 668 F.2d 1014 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 825 (1982);
Malcolm, 642 F.2d at 854 n.17.
53. See Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 395 U.S. 642 (1969); FTC v. Sun Oil Co., 371 U.S.
505 (1963); Littlejohn v. Shell Oil Co., 456 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1972).
54. American Oil Co. v. McMullin, 508 F.2d 1345, 1353 (10th Cir. 1975). Section 2 of the
Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act, prohibits, under certain circum-
stances, two forms of price discrimination: (1) primary line discrimination, where the seller
charges an artificially low (predatory) price in one market in order to drive out its competi-
tors, while subsidizing these lower prices with higher prices in other markets or profits made
at other levels in the production and distribution chain; and (2) secondary line discrimina-
tion-where the seller charges different prices for comparable goods to buyers competing in
the same market.
The proof problems for a plaintiff bringing a predatory pricing action under § 2 of the
Sherman Act also confront a plaintiff attempting to establish a primary line violation under
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to be discriminatory. First, this loophole in the Robinson-Pactman
Act allows a refiner to sell to its direct dealers at the same price it
sells to its jobbers. This means that the dealers who purchase from
the jobber will ultimately pay a higher dealer tankwagon price for
the same product purchased by the refiner's directly-supplied
dealer. Of course, this gives the refiner's directly-supplied dealers a
competitive advantage over the jobber's dealers. Courts have
found, however, that this does not constitute actionable price dis-
crimination because the refiner is not selling to the jobber's dealers
at a price different than it is selling to its directly-supplied deal-
-ers." This ignores the simple fact that both the jobber's dealers
and the refiner's direct dealers are competing in the same market
for the same customers with the same product.56
Second, the existing federal price discrimination laws do not
reach the situation where the refiner supplies its company-oper-
ated stations. To violate the Robinson-Patman Act, there must be
two sales to competing buyers. Courts have taken a literal ap-
proach to the term "sale" and have uniformly held that intra-com-
pany transfers are not "sales" for purposes of the Robinson-Pat-
man Act.57 This means that a refiner is free to supply gasoline to
its company-operated stations at a price lower than the price at
which it supplies the same product to its jobbers or directly-sup-
plied dealers who compete with the refiner's stations. This places
the jobbers and independent dealers at a substantial competitive
disadvantage.
As with violations of the Sherman Act, courts have required a
plaintiff alleging price discrimination to demonstrate an injury to
competition and not just injury to himself as a single competitor.58
the Clayton Act as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act. In secondary line cases, a disad-
vantaged plaintiff must show a discrimination in price (a net difference in price), between
two buyers of the same seller competing in the same market, of commodities of like grade
and quality. In both primary line and secondary line cases, the plaintiff must prove that the
effect of the discriminatory pricing may substantially injure competition. F. ROWE, PRICE
DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN Acr 141-206 (1962).
55. O'Byrne v. Cheker Oil Co., 727 F.2d 159, 164 (7th Cir. 1984).
56. To avoid this somewhat illogical result, courts have adopted the "indirect purchaser"
doctrine. This approach focuses on the competition for the ultimate purchase of the prod-
uct, and not the formal chain of distribution that can be established by the refiner in an
attempt to avoid the prohibitions against discrimination. See, e.g., Perkins v. Standard Oil
Co., 395 U.S. 642 (1969).
57. Shavrnoch v. Clark Oil & Refining Corp., 726 F.2d 291 (6th Cir. 1984); O'Byrne, 727
F.2d 159; Security Tire & Rubber Co. v. Gates Rubber Co., 598 F.2d 962 (5th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 942 (1979).
58. Borden Co. v. FTC, 381 F.2d 175 (5th Cir. 1967); see also Statement of Commission
Policy With Respect to Anticompetitive Practices in the Marketing of Gasoline, 3 TRADE
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In Sweeney & Sons, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 9 the Third Circuit Court
of Appeals affirmed a directed verdict for the defendant-refiner af-
ter the plaintiff failed to introduce evidence from which an infer-
ence could be drawn that the alleged price discrimination had a
substantially adverse effect on competition, rather than just ad-
versely affecting the plaintiff as an individual competitor.6 0 The
practical problem is again one of proof. Attempting to prove injury
to the market or injury to competition, the litigation becomes a
battle of experts, with the concomitant increase in costs.
B. Further Federal Response
The rapid emergence of state franchise protection statutes
moved Congress to enact the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act
(PMPA) 1 The major oil companies lobbied for such legislation to
avoid a variety of different state laws; retail dealers also supported
this effort.62 The Act prohibits a franchisor from canceling or fail-
ing to renew a retail franchise without cause. The Act protects
both the specific franchise and the "franchise relationship" that
exists between dealer and oil company beyond the mere terms of
their mutual contract.68
The PMPA has been criticized for its provision preempting con-
flicting state franchise laws as this denies dealers the more
favorable protections under various state laws.' However, some
courts have concluded that preemption extends only to state law
provisions that directly conflict with the PMPA, allowing the re-
mainder of a state law to survive. 5 Regardless of the preemption
issue, independent branded retail dealers have been given signifi-
cant statutory rights that permit them to remain in the retail mar-
ket, at least to the extent of not being arbitrarily dispossessed of
REG. REP. (CCH) 10,373 (FTC June 30, 1967).
59. 637 F.2d 105 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 911 (1981).
60. Id.
61. Petroleum Marketing Practices Act, Pub. L. No. 95-297, 92 Stat. 322 (1978) (current
version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2841 (1983)).
62. H. BROWN, FRANCHISING: REALITIES AND REMEDIES § 7.04(4) (1982).
63.. Cause which would justify termination or nonrenewal of the franchise includes fail-
ure to comply with franchise terms that are both reasonable and of material significance; the
occurrence of an event relevant to the franchise relationship that makes termination reason-
able; or withdrawal from the marketing area by the refiner. Strict notice requirements for
nonrenewal or termination are imposed. A dealer may sue in federal court to enjoin a viola-
tion and to recover damages suffered. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2801-41 (1982).
64. H. BROWN, supra note 62, § 7.04(4).
65. See, e.g., Ted's Tire Serv., Inc. v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 470 F.Supp. 163 (D.Conn.
1979); Bates v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 260 S.E.2d 367 (Ga. Ct. App. 1979).
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their stations.
In sum, the federal antitrust laws provide both public and pri-
vate remedies for the more egregious anticompetitive practices in
the petroleum industry. In the area of below cost sales and in cer-
tain forms of price discrimination, however, federal law does not
provide a practical remedy to the small competitor suing a major
refiner. This is in part the reason that numerous states have en-
acted legislation to address certain forms of predatory practices. It
is to these efforts that we now turn.
C. State Responses
1. General Below Cost Sales Bans
In addition to federal and state antitrust laws, many states have
enacted statutes banning below cost sales which injure competition
in general or harm a single competitor. Until the beginning of the
twentieth century, sellers had freedom to set prices as they wished.
The common law recognized no cause of action by a party injured
as a result of the predatory pricing policies of a competitor.6 How-
ever, this situation soon changed. In 1902, South Carolina became
the first state to adopt a statutory ban on sales made below cost
with the "intent or purpose of driving out competitors or . . . of
financially-injuring competitors. '8 7 Some state statutes adopted af-
ter South Carolina's covered all goods offered for sale, particularly
when offered by the original producer, while a few acts limited
themselves to specific products or categories of products.6 8 Known
as unfair practices acts, these below cost sales bans were aimed at
horizontal levels of price competition so that one seller could not
go below his cost to make a sale to the detriment of a competitor.
The effect was to create a minimum or floor price.6 9
At the same time, courts began to overturn the common law
view by recognizing a cause of action against a competitor who en-
66. See Kent Stores of New Jersey v. Wilentz, 14 F. Supp. 1, 6-8 (D.N.J. 1936) for a
summary of the common law view of predatory pricing.
67. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-3-150 (Law. Co-op. 1985). This section provides that it is unlaw-
ful for any person engaged in commerce to sell at less than cost; "such person shall be guilty
of a conspiracy to form or secure a trust or monopoly in restraint of trade," subject to a fine
of up to $5 thousand. This statute was enacted as part of South Carolina's general antitrust
laws, a pattern followed by several states during the rest of that decade. See WORKS PRO-
GRESS ADMIN. STATE PRICE CONTROL LEGISLATION XXVII n.4 (1940) (identifying 11 states as
having enacted predatory pricing prohibitions) [hereinafter cited as WPAJ.
68. See R. CALLMAN, supra note 23, at § 702 and statutes cited therein.
69. WPA, supra note 67, at XLVIII.
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gaged in a business "regardless of loss to himself, and for the sole
purpose of driving his competitor out of business. '7 0 In Dunshee v.
Standard Oil Co., 71 an oil wholesaler was subject to suit when it
entered the Des Moines, Iowa retail oil market with no real intent
to establish a retail business of its own, but with the intent to ruin
the existing business of a retailer who purchased part of his oil
needs from other suppliers. Once Standard Oil made an example of
the plaintiff by destroying his business, Standard Oil ceased its re-
tail operation and restricted itself once again to wholesale distribu-
tion. Although the court recognized that a defendant would break
no law in selling its product at one-half of plaintiffs retail price,
such a practice "would have a distinct bearing upon the reasona-
bleness of its method employed in diverting trade" and on whether
the defendant was "actuated by malice or spirit of wanton assault
upon the business of another. 7 2 Still, sales below cost were valid
even if made with malice toward a competitor as long as a second
legitimate motive was present, such as establishing an ongoing bus-
iness for profit.73
During the Depression, state legislation barring predatory pric-
ing flourished. Due to the advent of large retail marketing chains
and discount houses, the focus shifted from the production level to
the upper levels of the chain of distribution.74 At the federal level,
the National Recovery Administration (NRA) fashioned hundreds
of industry codes of fair competition that, among other provisions,
prohibited below cost sales. 75 The demise of the NRA, however,
70. Tuttle v. Buck, 119 N.W. 946, 948 (Minn. 1909). The Minnesota Supreme Court af-
firmed a verdict for a plaintiff-barber against a banker who opened a competing barber shop
with two salaried barbers. By virtue of his position, the defendant-banker was able to divert
the plaintiff's regular customers to his competing barbershop. The court found the defen-
dant's purpose "wicked, malicious, and unlawful. . . and not for the purpose of serving any
legitimate interest." Id. at 946. However, if the defendant had been found to have both a
malicious purpose to injure and a legitimate intent to make a profitable competing enter-
prise, then such a complaint could not have been brought against him. See Beardsley v.
Kilmer, 140 N.E. 203 (N.Y. 1923) in which economic injuries caused by a competing newspa-
perman were held not actionable where defendant's intent was both revenge against the
plaintiff and the establishment of a profitable ongoing business. The defendant's act of con-
tinuing in business after he forced out the plaintiff was seen as indicative of a legitimate
purpose.
71. 132 N.W. 371 (Iowa 1911).
72. Id. at 375.
73. Id.
74. WPA, supra note 67, at XXVII.
75. See Comment, Sales Below Cost Prohibitions: Private Price Fixing Under State
Law, 57 YALE L.J. 391, 405-406 (1948).
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brought these codes to an early end.7 6 Numerous trade groups that
had helped develop the NRA codes sought the adoption of state
unfair practices acts modeled after the defunct codes."
In 1935, California became one of the first states to adopt an
unfair practices statute under this effort. Its legislation created a
general prohibition against below cost sales when made for the
purpose of injuring and destroying competition.78 In the following
years, a number of other states adopted similar legislation requir-
ing an intent to injure competition or to destroy competition
before a below cost sale would be found unlawful.79 Some states
have done away with the "intent to injure" requirement before a
violation was established, and instead found unlawful any sale
made below cost that had an effect to injure competition."0 Consti-
tutional attacks on such laws met with limited success, with the
most successful challenges coming against state laws that required
no showing of an injurious intent before an unlawful below cost
sale would be found.81
The statutes adopted during the 1930's and 1940's also differed
in their scope and in their approach to defining costs. The Califor-
nia act, and others modeled after it, covered sales by producers,
wholesalers, and retailers doing business within the state.8 2 Other
76. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). Schechter Poultry
challenged an NRA poultry industry code for the New York City area that, among other
things, barred unfair methods of competition and minimum wage and hour standards. The
Supreme Court found the particular code invalid under the commerce clause because the
New York poultry industry did not affect interstate commerce. The National Industrial Re-
covery Act was held unconstitutional as an unlawful delegation of legislative power to the
NRA administrator.
77. Comment, supra note 75, at 407-09. Chief among these proponents were associations
of retail grocers and of gasoline, cigarette and confectionery distributors. Id.
78. 1935 CAL. STAT. 1546-1551, § 3, cited in Comment, Experience in California with
Fair Trade Legislation Restricting Price Cutting, 24 CALIF. L. REV. 640, 646 (1936). Califor-
nia law currently provides that sales below cost are unlawful when done for the purpose of
injuring competitors or of destroying competition. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17043 (West
1964).
79. Comment, Regulation of Business-Sales-Below-Cost Statutes-The Elements of
Violation and the Defense of Meeting Competition, 58 MICH. L. REv. 905, 909 (1960).
80. See also TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-203 (1984). Sales at less than cost are unlawful
where either the intent or effect is to injure a competitor, to impair competition, or to divert
trade from a competitor.
81. See, e.g., Daniel Loughran Co. v. Lord Baltimore Candy & Tobacco Co., 12 A.2d 201
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1940) (holding invalid a 1939 Maryland act which made sales below
cost unlawful if made with the intent, effect, or result of injuring competitors); State ex rel.
English v. Ruback, 281 N.W. 607 (Neb. 1938) (finding unconstitutional a statute requiring
no intent necessary to declare a below cost sale). But see McElhone v. Geror, 292 N.W. 414
(Minn. 1940).
82. See Comment, supra note 78, at 646. The Act defined cost of production (raw mater-
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states limited their coverage to distribution and retail sales and
defined cost as invoice or replacement cost. Most states passing
such laws during this time period covered all commodities offered
for sale. 83 Some states enacted laws that required a minimum
markup above cost that was presumptive of the cost of doing busi-
ness. Other states followed California's lead and attempted to set
out the elements of the cost of doing business. These were to be
added to the invoice or replacement cost in order to arrive at the
true cost of the item offered for sale.8 4 These statutes provided cer-
tain remedies to an injured competitor, including injunctive relief
and recovery of damages, with some states awarding treble dam-
ages. Violators were also exposed to potential criminal or civil
sanctions in some jurisdictions.
By 1948, thirty-one states had passed laws barring predatory
pricing, most of general application.8 5 During the post-Depression
era of economic growth and well-being, however, interest in these
statutory bans waned. It appears that few attempts were made to
enforce the provisions of these laws. " Since 1961, several states
have repealed their below cost sales prohibitions of either general
applicability to all commodities or of applicability to specific
products.8 7
ials, labor, and overhead expenses) and cost of distribution (invoice or replacement cost and
overhead expenses), suggesting both production and distribution were covered. Several
states followed California in covering sales by both producers and distributors. See ARK.
STAT. § 14313 (Pope 1937) (current version at AR. STAT. ANN. § 70-301-314 (1967)); COLO.
STAT. ANN. ch. 48, § 302(1) (Supp. 1946) (current version at COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 6-2-101-117
(1973 & Supp. 1984)); Ky. STAT. ch. 129A, § 4748h-1 to 14 (Carroll 1936) (current version at
Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 365.020-.070, 365.090 (1970 & Supp. 1984); MoNT. REV. CODE ch. 112A, §
7590.3 (Supp. 1939) (current versions.at MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 30-14-210-224 (1983)); OR.
CoMp. LAWS §43-104 (1940) (repealed by 1975 Or. Laws ch. 225); UTAH CODE ANN. tit. 16A,
ch. 4 (1943) (current version.at-UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 13-5-1 to 18 (1953 & Supp. 1983): WASH.
REV. STAT. § 5854-21 (Remington Supp. 1940) (repealed by 1983 Wash Laws ch. 288).
83. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 70-301 (1957) (making it unlawful to sell any article or prod-
uct, or service or output of a service trade at less than cost). WIS. STAT. ANN. § 100.30(3)
(West 1982) (sale of "any merchandise" at less than cost is unlawful) (adopted 1939).
84. Compare R.I. GEN. LAWS, § 6-13-1(a) (1970) ("[a] markup [is] to cover in part the
cost of doing business, which markup. . . shall be six per cent [sic] (6%) of the total cost at
the retail outlet" for retailer cost, with a 2% markup required of wholesale sales); to CALIF.
Bus. PROF. CODE § 17029 (West 1964) (the cost of doing business means all costs incurred in
conduct of business including, without limitation, "labor . . . rent, interest on borrowed
capital, depreciation, . . . delivery costs. . . licenses, taxes, insurance and advertising").
85. Comment, supra note 75, at 391.
86. E.g., Reiley, Enforcement of Legislation Prohibiting Sales Below Cost in Washing-
ton, 42 WASH. L.R. 817 (1967). The author termed the below-cost sales law as lying dormant
for 20 years with only two reported cases reaching the Washington Supreme Court between
1939, the year of enactment, and 1964.
87. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.. § 42-104-110 (West 1960), repealed by 1975 Conn.
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Over the years, there have been numerous challenges to the le-
gality of these state statutes prohibiting below cost sales. These
efforts have been largely unsuccessful. Recently, the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals upheld the below cost sales prohibition
in that state's Unfair Practices Act.88 In Hartsock-Flesher Candy
Co. v. Wheeling Wholesale Grocery Co.89, the court rejected sub-
stantive due process and vagueness challenges, and more impor-
tantly, held that the law did not conflict with the federal antitrust
law as both the state ban and the federal antitrust laws prohibit
sales below cost.90 This same result was obtained four years earlier
by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in the legendary case of
William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking
Co.91
2. Specific Petroleum Marketing Below Cost Sales Bans
Several states have recently recognized the need for additional
statutory bars to below cost sales and discriminatory pricing in pe-
troleum marketing. In addition to Florida, five states have specific
statutes barring the sale of motor fuels below cost: Alabama, Geor-
gia, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Utah.2 Below cost sales of
motor fuels in the other twenty-three states that have general be-
low cost sales bans can be remedied under those statutes.
Massachusetts makes it unlawful to sell motor fuel at retail for
less than the cost to that retail dealer when it is done with the
"intent to injure competitors or destroy substantially or lessen
competition."93 New Jersey bars the offering of rebates or other
Pub. Acts 75-31 (Reg. Sess.); NEB. REV. STAT. § 59, art. 12 (1968), repeated by 1972 Neb.
Laws 1410; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 358 (1970), repeated by 1977 N.H. Laws 245:1.
88. W. VA. CODE § 47-11a-1-14 (1980 & Supp. 1985).
89. 328 S.E.2d 144 (W. Va. 1985).
90. Id.
91. 668 F.2d 1014 (9th Cir. 1981). The Ninth Circuit in William Inglis & Sons, and the
West Virginia court in Hartsock, 328 S.E.2d 144, held that there was no conflict even
though the state statutes defined "cost" in a manner different from federal antitrust laws.
The prevailing attitude under federal antitrust law is to focus on marginal or average varia-
ble costs; the state statutes, on the other hand, defined cost as average total costs. 668 F.2d
at 1038.
92. ALA. CODE § 8-22-1. (1984) ("Motor Fuel Marketing Act"); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
94, § 295P (West 1984) ("Unfair Motor Fuel Practices Act"); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:6-22
(1964); UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-16 (Supp. 1983); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-250 (Supp. 1985) ("Be-
low Cost Sales Act") (effective July 1, 1985); Ch. 85-74, 1985 Fla. Laws 429, ("Motor Fuel
Marketing Practices Act").
93. MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 94, § 295P (West 1984). Sales made in good faith to meet
the price of a competitor are allowed. A violation could result in a fine of up to $1 thousand.
Unlike other such laws, the Massachusetts provision is directed only to retail dealers; other
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discounts in connection with a motor fuel sale with the intent to
injure competitors or to destroy or lessen competition., Such re-
bates have the effect of creating a sale which is below dealer cost.
The laws in Alabama, Georgia, and Utah have all been passed
since 1980 and were influenced by a model bill drafted by the Na-
tional Oil Jobbers Council (NOJC).9 5 Below cost sales are banned
except for several enumerated exceptions, including good faith at-
tempts to meet the equally low price of a competitor. The model
act also bars discrimination in the selling price charged to competi-
tors on the same level of competition." No requirement of an in-
tent to injure competition or a competitor is necessary. A showing
that a sale was made below cost creates a presumption that shifts
the burden to the seller to show a justification for the sale. 7
Many of the NOJC provisions found their way into the Utah and
Alabama statutes. The Alabama law provides that an effect result-
ing from a below-cost sale which injured competition was adequate
to establish a violation in the presence of predatory intent.98 The
Utah law requires no intent or detrimental effect upon competition
or a competitor before a below cost sale is unlawful because any
sale below made cost is per se unlawful.99
The recently enacted Georgia law'00 varies from both the Ala-
bama and Utah laws. A reasonable cost of doing business, to be
added to the seller's invoice or transfer price, is to be computed
pursuant to generally accepted accounting principles plus trans-
portation charges.10 1 The Georgia statute only requires an effect
states focus on refiners, distributors, and retailers. Id. §§ 295 R-S.
94. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:6-22 (1964). The legislature found that unfair methods of com-
petition had emerged in motor fuel marketing which harmed the public by hampering sup-
ply. The Act does not directly bar below cost sales, but the ban on rebates and discounts has
that effect. The Act further prohibits price discrimination between different buyers.
95. MODEL STATE LEGISLATION: To PROHIBIT MOTOR FuEL SALES BELow COST (1981) (Na-
tional Oil Jobbers Council). The NOJC did not endorse the model bill but compiled it based
upon provisions in'existing state laws. States were urged to study the proposal and select
those provisions they found warranted. This model act reflects the provision of the 1935
California law which brings producers, distributors and retailers within its scope. Cost is
defined as the cost of raw materials for producers, and invoice or replacement cost, plus the
cost of doing business for wholesalers and retailers. The cost of doing business is broadly
defined to include, but is not limited to, labor, rent, interest, depreciation, maintenance,
freight and business licenses, and taxes. Id. art. II §§ (1)(d)-(e).
96. Id. art. III, § 2. The act further provides for civil penalties.
97. Id. art. II, § 9.
98. ALA. CODE § 8-22-6 (1984).
99. UTAH CODE. ANN. § 13-16-4 (Supp. 1983).
100. 1985 Ga. Laws 389.(codified at GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-250 (Supp. 1985)).
101. GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-253 (2) (Supp. 1985). This is a more flexible standard of the
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that injures competition before a violation will be found but that
effect must be one that acts substantially to lessen competition or
tends to create a monopoly or to injure, destroy, or prevent compe-
tition.102 This appears to require a greater showing of actual or po-
tential injury before judicial relief may be sought by an injured
competitor. Yet, the Georgia law exposes the knowing buyer in a
below cost sale to liability for damages inflicted upon an injured
competitor.10 3 As will be explained below, Florida's new law differs
dramatically from the efforts of her sister states.
3. State Franchise Protections
Several states have responded to the plight of the independent
service station dealer by attempting to equalize his bargaining po-
sition with the refiner or jobber who owns the dealer's station.
Most of the independent branded retailers lease or operate their
stations under a franchise from their petroleum supplier. Acting
individually, these dealers are often in a weak position to bargain
with the refiner or jobber over contractual terms. Thus, to enhance
the dealers ability to bargain effectively, states have enacted stat-
utes giving dealers a greater economic interest in their franchise
and stronger protections against arbitrary franchise
cancellations.' 04
By 1978, a majority of states had enacted statutes that provided
new protections to the franchise dealer.'08 Known as "good cause"
cost of doing business than the detailed list of includible costs set out in the Alabama and
Utah laws.
102. Id. § 10-1-254(a).
103. Id. § 10-1-254(f). It is unlawful for any person engaged in sales of motor fuel
"knowingly to induce or to receive a below cost or discriminatory price" as prohibited by
this act. The Georgia law does reflect some of the other provisions of the NOJC model act in
the evidentiary presumption which shifts justification to the defendant upon a showing of a
below cost sale. Yet the law only allows recovery of actual damages, expressly excluding
punitive damages and any class action enforcement. To that extent it makes the law a less
attractive means of private enforcement.
104. See H. BROWN, supra note 62, § 7.04[1]. The terms of a retail petroleum franchise
will often set the wholesale price paid for motor fuel by the dealer, the standards by which
the station is to be operated, the hours of operation, and the sales of preferred products.
Due to the strict terms, the dealer must exercise great care to avoid breaching the franchise
terms. At renewal, oil company franchisors are free to dictate the terms and length of any
extensions. It is to these potential abuses that such dealer protection laws are directed.
105. Goetz & Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. Rav. 1089, 1132 n.100
(1981). In 15 states, such protections existed under general limitations on franchise termina-
tions that extended to all franchises. See, e.g., DEL. CODE. ANN., tit. 6, § 2251 (1975), "Secur-
ity for Franchised Distributors." The failure to renew a franchise is unlawful if done without
good cause or with bad faith. A franchise provision allowing termination or nonrenewal
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statutes, they reflect a changing theory about the franchise rela-
tionship, moving away from a contract approach to one based on a
joint venture concept.'"' This view finds that both the oil company
and the dealer add something to the success of the enterprise; the
oil company contributes its nationally-known trademark and pe-
troleum products, and the dealer contribtutes his services and ef-
forts toward realizing a profit for both.107 These statutes recognize
that the dealer owns the business he operates at the franchised
premises. As such, he is entitled to the protection of the law before
the value of his business, in the form of customer goodwill, is taken
away from him without just and good cause.108
4. Prohibitions on Price Discrimination
In addition to attempting to ban below cost sales, many states
have also enacted statutory prohibitions on price discrimination
between a seller's customers or between regions of a state. Thirty-
one states have general laws barring discrimination in prices
charged different purchasers at the same level of distribution.109
Forty-six states have found the need for legislation dealing with
price discrimination in sales of specific products or industries, such
as insurance, alcoholic beverages, tobacco products, and agricul-
tural products. °10 Many states enacted price discrimination laws,
along with below cost sales bans, as part of their unfair sales laws.
Other states enacted such bans as part of their antitrust laws with
price discrimination seen as a monopolistic practice."'
Many of these price discrimination laws prohibit geographic dis-
crimination between localities, such as selling a product at a lower
price in one area than in another.112 Other statutes prohibit price
discrimination in the form of different prices charged to different
without justification is construed to mean that a franchisor may only terminate justly. No
franchisor may charge, for leased property, an excessive rent in light of the property's use
and the franchisor's interest in the property.
106. Comment, Retail Gasoline Franchise Terminations and Nonrenewals Under Title
I of the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act, 1980 DUKE L.J. 522, 527.
107. Id. at 527-28.
108. H. BROWN, supra note 62, § 7.0411].
109. See 4 TRADE. REG. REP. (CCH) 30,201-35,585 (1982) for a listing and the full text
of each state's statute.
110. See 1 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 3514 (1982) for a listing of states having these
special laws and the products or industries included.
111. S. OPPENHEIM & G. WESTON, UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES AND CONSUMER PROTECTION
787 (3d ed. 1974).
112. 1 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 3510 and 3562 (1982). Florida has such a prohibition
on locality discrimination. See FLA. STAT. § 540.01 (1983).
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customers at the same level of distribution,11 an approach which is
consistent with federal antitrust law. Most states provide that the
seller entertain some intent to injure either competition in general
or a single competitor. This latter standard is less restrictive than
federal law, and a few states do not require a showing of intent
before a violation will be found. 1 4 In those states, any sale shown
to be made at a price different than that charged another customer
will be presumed discriminatory and unlawful. Of course, this is
also a lower standard of proof than that imposed under federal
law.
As in the federal price discrimination laws, state statutes give
sellers several defenses. Sales of products of different grade and
quality, differences in quantities purchased, or differences in the
cost of transportation will justify price discrepancies in products.11 5
A different price offered in good faith to meet the price of a com-
petitor may also be invoked as a defense. Additionally, certain
sales are exempt from the ban on different prices charged to simi-
lar customers.116
Remedies for the violation of price discrimination statutes in-
clude injunctive relief and in some states penal sanctions.1 1 7 Civil
damage actions may also be brought in some states by persons who
can demonstrate an injury to themselves from these anticompeti-
tive practices.11 8 Still, the laws appear to be rarely enforced or used
in private actions. 1 9
5. Florida's Geographic Price Discrimination Protection
Prior to the enactment of the Motor Fuel Marketing Practices
Act, Florida had few laws that could be invoked to restrain preda-
tory trade practices. Florida had not joined the large number of
113. S. OPPENHEIM & G. WESTON, supra note 111, at 787.
114. 1 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 1 3528 (1982).
115. Id. at 3538, 3540.
116. R. CALLMAN, supra note 23, § 7.53. Exempt sales include sales of damaged or perish-
able goods, court-ordered sales, clearance and liquidation sales, and sales to charitable and
governmental organization. Id.
117. R. CALLMAN, supra note 23, at § 7.53.
118. S. OPPENHEIM & G. WESTON, supra note 111, at 788. Some states provide for treble
damages to a successful plaintiff. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17082 (West 1964)
("[A]ny plaintiff . . . shall be entitled to recover three times the amount of the actual
damages.").
119. S. OPPENHEIM & G. WESTON, supra note 111, at 788. The mere prospect of a private
enforcement action, with the threat of treble damages, may be sufficient to discourage such
practices. In that sense, these price discrimination laws may be self-enforcing.
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states which had adopted specific bans on sales at less than cost.
No reported cases have been found where an action for predatory
pricing was brought solely under Florida's antitrust statutes. A ge-
ographical price discrimination statute, applicable to the sales of
all commodities, was enacted to prevent discrimination "between
different sections, communities, or cities of this state.
120
Under the statute, the seller must engage in predatory pricing
with the purpose of destroying the business of a competitor. The
seller may justify different sales prices by showing a difference in
transportation costs or a good faith effort to meet competition.'21
Enforcement lies with the Department of Legal Affairs and the
state attorneys.122 A violation of the law is a misdemeanor. If a
corporation is found guilty of these practices, its license to conduct
business in the state can immediately be revoked. 2 ' Despite its
availability, this price discrimination ban has been rarely used. 24
One commentator views Florida's geographical price discrimina-
tion statute to be of dubious value in eliminating injurious prac-
tices. This is due to the fact that the law does not permit private
enforcement by injured competitors, as is allowed with many other
unfair practices acts.2 5 Typically, it is this private enforcement
mechanism, or the threat of its use by an injured competitor, that
provides meaningful enforcement against such practices.
A. Florida's Divorcement Law
Florida was a co-leader with Maryland in attempting to deal
with abusive refiner practices in 1974 when both states passed "re-
tail divorcement" laws restricting refiners' ability to directly retail
120. FLA. STAT. § 540.01 (1983). The law was first enacted in 1915. See ch. 6945, 1915 Fla.
Laws 326.
121. Id.
122. FLA. STAT. § 540.03 (1983).
123. Id. § 540.04 (1983).
124. In Syfo Water Co. v. Chakoff, 182 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965), a distributor of
seltzer water, Chakoff, alleged geographical price discrimination by Syfo Water Co., a com-
peting distributor. Testimony showed Syfo Water was selling its product at eight cents per
gallon in areas where Chakoff did business and at 15 cents per gallon in other areas. The
trial court enjoined both parties from such practices. On appeal, the reviewing court found
no evidence that Syfo Water engaged in these practices with the intent of destroying
Chakoff's business and reversed the lower court. Chakoff failed to curb his competitor's
practice of selling at different prices because he was unable to establish Syfo Water Co. and
its employees intended to destroy his business.
125. Kemker, Price Discrimination Under the Robinson- Patman Act, 14 U. FLA. L. REv.
155, 156 n.10 (1984).
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their motor fuel. Maryland's statute2 6 imposes an absolute prohi-
bition on refiners selling motor fuel at retail. Section 526.151, Flor-
ida Statutes, limits refiners' directly-owned retail operations to
three percent of the total number of retail outlets selling petro-
leum products under the refiner's primary brand or secondary
brand. While the Maryland and Florida statutes attempted to ad-
dress other abusive marketing practices by refiners, the divorce-
ment provisions were the substance of these laws.
Several major refiners challenged Florida's divorcement law in
state court,1 7 alleging it to be unconstitutional. They sought a
temporary injunction prior to the law's effective date of October 1,
1974. The Second Circuit Court entered an order granting the re-
finers' request for a temporary injunction, and thus barred enforce-
ment of the statute. Simultaneously, several of the mini-majors
challenged the application of the new statute to their retail outlets,
arguing that they did not offer a full line of automotive services
and were not, therefore, "service stations" under the law.1 28 On
September 27, 1974, the same circuit court ruled in favor of the
mini-majors and enjoined enforcement of the law against them,12 9
In January 1975, the circuit court ruled the divorcement statute
unconstitutional, holding it to be vague and ambiguous,an invalid
exercise of the police power, discriminatory, and violative of the
Equal Protection Clause.130 The state did not appeal this ruling
and thus ended, for the moment, Florida's special regulation of re-
finers' marketing operations and practices.
Maryland's divorcement statute experienced a similar fate at the
trial court level. The same major refiners attacked Maryland's law
on identical grounds as those raised in Florida. The law was held
unconstitutional, but Maryland appealed the lower court's ruling.
In 1977, the Maryland Court of Appeals reversed the lower court
and upheld the constitutionality of the law." ' This decision was
appealed to the United States Supreme Court by the majors, and
the Court rendered a lengthy opinion upholding the law.1 32
126. MD. ANN. CODE art. 56, § 157E (Supp. 1977).
127. Exxon Corp. v. Conner, No. 74-1449 (Fla. 2d Cir. Ct. 1974); Shell Oil Co. v. Conner,
No. 74-1577 (Fla. 2d Cir. Ct. 1974); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Conner, Case No. 74-1772 (Fla.
2d Cir. Ct. 1974). These cases were later consolidated.
128. Direct Oil Corp. v. Conner, No. 74-1185 (Fla. 2d Cir. Ct. 1974).
129. Id.
130. See supra note 127 (final judgment entered Jan. 23, 1975).
131. Governor of Md. v. Exxon Corp., 370 A.2d 1102 (Md. 1977), aff'd, 437 U.S. 117
(1978).
132. Id.
BELOW COST PETROLEUM SALES
Divorcement was thereafter accomplished in Maryland and it
continues today. Florida's service station dealers continued to pur-
sue retail divorcement by supporting such legislation in each Flor-
ida legislative session from 1975 through 1982. During each of
these years, the jobbers joined the refiners in opposing and defeat-
ing the bills.
In 1983, however, the jobbers began exploring possible legislative
measures to address refiner abuses. The jobbers persuaded the
House Commerce Committee to conduct an informal study of the
industry, particularly the marketing sector. 3 Furthermore, the
jobbers insisted that the state begin enforcement of its divorce-
ment statute in light of the Supreme Court's ruling in Exxon
Corp."34 Doyle Conner, Commissioner of Agriculture and Consumer
Services, charged with responsibility of enforcement of the law, re-
fused to begin enforcement. Accordingly, in June 1983, the jobbers
filed a petition for writ of mandamus to compel the Commis-
sioner's performance under the statute."'
Ironically, the petition was heard by the same circuit judge who
had held the statute unconstitutional some nine years earlier. The
judge remained firm, dismissing the petition for mandamus."3 '
That order was appealed by the jobbers to the First District Court
of Appeal. The First District reversed the lower court and declared
the Florida divorcement law constitutional. 3 7
On February 1, 1985, the Department of Agriculture and Con-
sumer Services published its notice of intent to adopt proposed
rules interpreting and implementing the divorcement statute.38"
The proposed rules were immediately attacked by the majors and
mini-majors, who filed petitions to determine the invalidity of the
rules."39 On February 22, the Department of Agriculture and Con-
sumer Services conducted a hearing to receive public comments re-
garding the proposed rules. The rule challenges were referred to
133. See generally Florida Petroleum Marketers Ass'n, Petrogram page 10, col. 1-2 (Oct.
1983) [hereinafter cited as FPMA Petrogram].
134. 437 U.S. at 117.
135. State ex rel. Gas Kwick, Inc. v. Conner, 453 So. 2d 863 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. 11 Fla. Admin. Weekly 366 (Feb. 1, 1985) (proposing Rule 5F-7.01-.03)
139. The following cases were filed in the State of Florida, Division of Administrative
Hearings: Autotronics Syss, Inc. v. Dep't of Agric. and Consumer Servs., No. 85-0646R
(1985); Amerada Hess Corp. v. Dep't of Agric. and Consumer Servs., No. 85-0647R (1985);
Kayo Oil Co. v. Dep't of Agric. and Consumer Servs., No. 85-0649R (1985); Exxon Corp. v.
Department of Agric. and Consumer Servs., No. 85-0650R (1985); Ashland Oil, Inc. v. De-
partment of Agric. and Consumer Servs., No. 85-0651R (1985).
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the Division of Administrative Hearings but were never heard as
the legislature convened and passed the new Florida Motor Fuel
Marketing Practices Act, 140 repealing Florida's divorcement law.
III. FLORIDA'S MOTOR FUEL MARKETING PRACTICES ACT
A. Legislative History
The First District Court of Appeal decision declaring section
526.151, the retail gasoline divorcement statute, constitutional,
kicked off a vigorous campaign by refiners to repeal the law.141
During the first few months following the First District's decision,
the refiners had two goals: to slow implementation of the enforce-
ment of the divorcement statute by challenging rulemaking initi-
ated by the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services,
and to marshal legislative support for the repeal of the statute dur-
ing the 1985 Regular Session.
Florida's petroleum wholesalers, who had initiated the litigation
due to continuing deterioration of relations with refiners, pushed
for adoption and implementation of the Department of Agriculture
and Consumer Services' divorcement rules. The wholesalers also
organized a legislative defense of the divorcement statute'42 As the
1985 Regular Session approached, the industry had realigned on
the divorcement issue; refiners now opposed both dealers and
140. Ch. 85-74, 1985 Fla. Laws 429.
141. Exxon Corp. v Conner, No. 74-1449 (Fla. 2d Cir. Ct. 1974); Shell Oil Co. v. Conner,
No. 74-1577 (Fla. 2d Cir. Ct. 1974); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Conner, No. 74-1772 (Fla. 2d
Cir. Ct. 1974).
142. Interview with Carl Adams, Exec. Dir., Fla. Petroleum Marketers Ass'n, in Talla-
hassee, Fla. (July 17, 1985) [hereinafter cited as Interview]. It is significant to note that
during the time the 1974 divorcement law was held in abeyance by the circuit court's injunc-
tion, retail petroleum dealers mounted extensive legislative campaigns from 1975 through
1982 to persuade Florida's legislature to replace section 526.151 with another retail divorce-
ment statute. See e.g., Fla. HB 35 (1982); Fla. HB 802 (1981); Fla. HB 1310 (1980); Fla. HB
1462 (1975). Refiners, of course, opposed these legislative attempts by the dealers. Ironi-
cally, the wholesalers also adamantly opposed those legislative bills. By 1983, however, the
wholesalers realized that peaceful coexistence with the refiners was a delusion. Wholesalers
found they could not compete with refiners for retail markets. The virtually unlimited re-
sources of refiners within the structure of the petroleum industry placed the future liveli-
hood of wholesalers in jeopardy.
In the summer and fall of 1983, the House Comm. on Com. had a special subcommittee
conduct hearings regarding petroleum industry problems. This was an ad hoc study commit-
tee chaired by Rep. Christian Meffert, Dem., Ocala. See FPMA Petrogram at 10, cols. 1-2.
These hearings were held as a result of requests from the wholesale segment of the industry.
The Subcommittee proposed no legislation at the end of these hearings; therefore, the legis-
lature did not address the issue in 1984.
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wholesalers. 14 3
Prior to the opening of the session, the refiners solicited House
and Senate members to sponsor legislative bills repealing the di-
vorcement law. By early 1985, it appeared that Senator Fox,"" a
powerful member of the Senate Commerce Committee, and Repre-
sentative Burnsed, 14 5 Chairman of the House Commerce Commit-
tee, would sponsor the refiners' repealer bills. At this juncture, leg-
islators expressed mixed feelings about the issue. Some legislators
felt the law, which had been judicially held in abeyance since 1973,
should have an opportunity to function before judging it to be det-
rimental. Others, by far the majority, felt the law was ill-conceived
in 1973 and equally repugnant in 1985.146
As the legislative session became imminent, the refiners could
not maintain a unified legislative repose. Several of the mini-ma-
jors, with integrated refining-to-retailing operations, decided not to
risk an all or nothing position with the legislature. While outright
repeal of the divorcement law was their preference, they expressed
a desire to negotiate with the wholesalers in an attempt to find
compromise legislation, and thereby largely defuse the legislative
fight. 14 7  These mini-majors-Tenneco, Hess, Marathon and
others-would be required to alter their entire marketing system if
the divorcement law was implemented. This defection of the mini-
majors stymied the primary refiner lobbying arm, the Florida Pe-
troleum Council. Since both majors and mini-majors belong to the
Council, there was no consensus position which the Council could
actively promote.
On February 20, 1985, Senator Fox prefiled the repealer bill in
the Senate on behalf of the refiners. 14 8 Also at this time, the mini-
majors approached the petroleum wholesaler's organization ' 9 in an
effort to initiate discussions about compromise legislation. The
wholesalers, believing that retention of the divorcment law would
be difficult and that other legislation might provide better relief to
their segment of the industry, were willing to explore other alter-
natives. The two groups immediately focused on the below cost
143. Interview, supra note 142.
144. Dem., Miami.
145. Dem., Lakeland.
146. Interview, supra note 142.
147. Id.
148. Fla. SB 237 (1985).
149. The Florida Petroleum Marketers Association, Inc. is the trade association which
represents petroleum jobbers in Florida.
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sales legislation passed in 1984 by the Alabama Legislature 5° and
the similar Georgia measure, which was under consideration by the
Georgia Legislature at that time. 5' After spirited negotiations, the
two groups agreed to propose to the Florida Legislature a compro-
mise tailored after the Alabama law. Pertinent parts of the com-
promise were: (a) a prohibition on sales below cost by refiners, re-
tailers, and wholesalers; (b) a prohibition of price discrimination,
including discrimination occurring in intracompany transfers at
prices lower than the sales prices to independent purchasers; (c) a
prohibition on refiners selling to commercial accounts at prices
lower than their prices to wholesalers; and (d) repeal of the di-
vorcement law. 52
The next step was to sell this proposal to the dealers and to
block an attack by the majors and other groups on the compro-
mise. Neither the dealers nor the majors had been part of the ne-
gotiations, and the compromise was deemed unacceptable by both
groups. Even though the dealers and the majors refused to em-
brace the proposal, the mini-majors and the wholesalers elected to
push for its adoption. The obvious method for accomplishing this
objective was to have the compromise proposal substituted for
Senator Fox's repealer bill. That bill was scheduled to be heard by
the Senate Commerce Committee on April 11.'51 The morning of
the 11th, before the Committee meeting, Senator Fox adamantly
refused the suggestion that she amend her bill with the compro-
mise proposal. In fact, during the Committee presentation, Senator
Fox blasted the compromise as industry price fixing and predicted
that the proposal would increase retail gasoline prices.1 54 Similar
attacks came from the majors, the dealers, the American Associa-
tion of Retired Persons, the Florida League of Municipalities, the
Florida School Board Association, the Florida Trucking Associa-
tion, the Florida Farm Bureau, and others. 5 In the end, the com-
promise was soundly defeated and Senator Fox's repealer bill
passed intact.15
The wholesalers were left wondering if they could now stop out-
150. ALA. CODE § 8-22-1 (1984).
151. 1985 Ga. Laws 385 (codified at GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-250 (Supp. 1985)).
152. Interview, supra note 142.
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right repeal. The mini-majors were left pondering whether they
had made a tactical error in breaking rank with the majors and if
repeal without compromise was now possible. Nothing seemed cer-
tain; the mini-major and wholesaler coalition appeared strained.
Indeed, as is constantly the case in legislative affairs, the parties
had to reevaluate their respective positions and determine whether
they were stronger together, separate, or realigned with others. Af-
ter some reflection, the coalition determined that it would continue
its attempts to achieve a compromise; recognizing, however, that
the Florida Legislature was not disposed toward acceptance of leg-
islation substantially similar to Alabama's below cost sales law.1 57
The mini-majors and wholesalers quickly sought the counsel of
the House leadership. Representative Burnsed, who had prefiled
the House repealer bill, was contacted and consideration of the
House bill was delayed. This delay allowed the mini-majors and
wholesalers additional time to piece together a compromise before
the repealer bill was to be heard by the House Commerce Commit-
tee.1 58 Although the parties continued to meet, they became some-
what more independent in their attempts to draft another compro-
mise. The mini-majors backed away from several of their earlier
concessions to the wholesalers. The wholesalers likewise retreated
on a few points due to political realities. For example, the whole-
salers recognized that the prohibition of commercial sales by refin-
ers at prices below wholesale drew too many opponents, such as
trucking interests, the Florida League of Municipalities, and other
commercial end users. Both parties recognized that the prohibition
of below cost sales at all levels was an overkill which had become
an anti-consumer issue in the Senate.5 9
The mini-majors attempted to include the majors in these com-
promise deliberations while the wholesalers met with the dealers in
an attempt to include their concerns in the negotiations. The deal-
ers wanted two issues addressed. First, they wanted additional
franchise protections whereby majors, wholesalers, and other
franchisors could not mandate conversion of their gas stations to
convenience stores. Secondly, the dealers wanted additional
franchise protection from substantial rent increases.160
157. Interview, supra note 142.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. Although dealer franchises are protected under the federal Petroleum Market-
ing Practices Act, the Act contains no prohibitions against conversion of the premises to
another form of retail gasoline facility. Standard service stations with work bays and full-
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The majors were still largely uninterested in substitute legisla-
tion and wanted the divorcement law repealed without compro-
mise. They remained adamantly opposed to any below cost sales
prohibitions or other marketing restrictions being advocated by the
wholesalers. The two dealer issues were deemed heresy by the ma-
jors. They maintained that they had a right to convert their service
stations into convenience stores to obtain maximum profits. Fur-
thermore, the majors would not consider any proposals restricting
rent increases, contending that this was exclusively within federal
jurisdiction under the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act.'
The wholesalers continued to push for some type of below cost
sales legislation which they believed necessary to have any mean-
ingful legislation addressing their problems in the marketplace.
The wholesalers and dealers reached an accord whereby the deal-
ers would support the wholesalers' proposals regarding marketing
restrictions in exchange for the wholesalers support of the dealer's
proposals on station conversions and unjustified rent increases. 162
They prepared a draft bill which: (1) eliminated the below cost
sales prohibition at the refining and wholesale levels and restricted
only refiners at retail; (2) eliminated the restriction on refiners sell-
ing to commerical accounts at prices less than wholesale; and (3)
contained a severability clause intended to reinstate divorcement if
the marketing restrictions were declared unconstitutional. 6 3
The mini-majors, now in basic accord with the majors, countered
with a price discrimination bill which the majors would accept.
They, like the majors, refused to consider the demands of the deal-
ers, by arguing that the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act pre-
empted any state action in the area of petroleum franchises. They
opposed any below cost sales provisions and suggested that the
service gasoline pumps were being converted into total self-service facilities, generally in
conjunction with the convenience store or mini-convenience store concept. Dealers had tra-
ditionally engaged in gasoline sales, tire and battery sales, and auto repairs, with little train-
ing or experience in marketing food and convenience items and managing such operations.
Consequently, when dealers stations were transformed into convenience stores with self-
service gasoline, the dealers often failed to be successful, thereby allowing the franchisor to
remove them from the locations and replace them with company personnel. See supra note
24 and accompanying text. The Petroleum Marketing Practices Act also addresses negotia-
tion and renegotiation of gasoline franchises, but it does not contain any rent control provi-
sions. 15 U.S.C. § 2801 (1983). Dealers maintain that franchisors had imposed abusive rent
increases in Florida, due to their desire to directly operate the more favorable locations
leased to dealers. Interview, supra note 142.
161. Interview, supra note 142.
162. Id.
163. Id.
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Senate Commerce Committee's action operated as clear notice that
the legislature deemed such marketing restrictions anti-
consumer. 16
4
The industry representatives met in late April to exchange and
discuss the pertinent provisions of their respective prosposals.
Representatives from the Florida Petroleum Council, the Florida
Petroleum Marketers Association, and the Service Station Dealers
Association, as well as representatives from individual refineries at-
tended this meeting. 1 5 The meeting was not fruitful. The parties
seemed further from agreement than ever before. A subsequent se-
ries of meetings followed where each group presented a priority list
for any new compromise. The majors, for the most part, were un-
compromising throughout. However, only a few issues thwarted ba-
sic agreement between the wholesalers and mini-majors. Specifi-
cally, the mini-majors refused to accept provisions of the
wholesaler-dealer draft which would have restricted their award of
rebates at the wholesale and retail levels. The wholesalers were ad-
amant that the legislation had to preclude refiners from providing
rebates or discounts to their directly-supplied dealers when dis-
counts were not offered to their wholesalers in the same market
area. The wholesalers also demanded a severability clause, which
provided that the entire Act would become void if any of the provi-
sions of the law were found unconstitutional. The clause further
provided that failure of the Act would reinstate' Florida's divorce-
ment law. This was unacceptable to the mini-majors; the dealer
demands also continued to be unacceptable. "'
With none of the parties willing to yield, the majors and the
mini-majors decided to test the sentiment of the House Commerce
Committee, rather than reaching an accord with the wholesalers
and dealers. Representative Burnsed was informed of the parties'
failure to reach an accord. The Commerce Committee staff was in-
structed to draft an amendment to the repealer bill for considera-
tion at the next Commerce Committee meeting.117
On May 7, the House Commerce Committee hearing room was
packed with representatives from all interested groups, as well as




167. Memorandum to Interested Parties from Rep. Burnsed, Chairman, Fla. H.R.,
Comm. on Com. (May 2, 1985).
168. Fla. H.R., Comm. on Com., tape recording of proceedings (May 7, 1985) (on file
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vehemently attacked the amendment rather than seeking outright
repeal of the divorcement law. An attempt was made to eliminate
the restrictions on refiner rebates, but the Committee defeated the
attempt overwhelmingly. The wholesalers and dealers supported
the Committee staff draft. The mini-majors, sensing the tremen-
dous Committee support for the staff amendment, also supported
it. The Committee unanimously passed the amendment."6 9
As a result of the House Commerce Committee vote, momentum
seemed to swing in favor of the wholesalers and dealers. Even
though the Senate Commerce Committee had indicated a prefer-
ence for outright repeal of the divorcement statute,' 70 a repeal
could only occur if both the Senate and House concurred. The
House Commerce Committee action was a strong indication that
the House favored legislation which would provide some relief to
wholesalers and dealers in exchange for the repeal of the divorce-
ment law.
Again, the interested parties had their own biased perceptions of
the status of the matter. The majors probably felt that they could
persuade the Senate to pass Senator Fox's repealer bill and then
persuade the House to accept that bill, or a substantially watered
down substitute for the House Commerce Committee bill. The
mini-majors felt they could not lose since they felt confident that
legislation was certain to pass and that whatever bill did pass
would include repeal of divorcement. The wholesalers were obvi-
ously buoyed by the House Commerce Committee action, but now
had to gain Senate acceptance of the new draft which contained
some provisions that were still unacceptable to many senators.
Senator Fox called a meeting of all interested parties within a
matter of days following the House Commerce Committee ac-
tion.17 ' At that meeting, she indicated her willingness to support
the House Commerce Committee amendment on the floor of the
Senate as a substitute to her repealer bill.172 Rumors continued
that the majors intended an intensive lobbying effort in the Senate
to persuade senators not to accept the House Commerce Commit-
tee's product. In the meantime, on May 20, the House passed the
Commerce Committee substitute by a vote of 114 to 0. 7 Three
with committee).
169. Id.
170. Fla. SB 237 (1985).
171. Interview, supra note 142.
172. Id.
173. FLA. H.R. JouR 446-47 (Reg. Sess. 1985).
BELOW COST PETROLEUM SALES
days later, Senator Fox spoke in favor of the bill when she
presented it on the floor of the Senate. The Senate passed the leg-
islation by a vote of 35-0.174 On June 5, the bill was signed into law
by Governor Graham. 176 The industry battle over this legislation
came to an end.
The legislative findings and intent provide:
The Legislature finds that fair and healthy competition in the
marketing of motor fuel provides maximum benefits to consumers
in Florida, and that certain marketing practices which impair
such competition are contrary to the public interest. Predatory
practices and, under certain conditions, discriminatory practices,
are unfair trade practices and restraints which adversely affect
motor fuel competition. It is the intent of the Legislature to en-
courage competition and promote the general welfare of Florida
citizens by prohibiting such unfair practices.'""
Whether this law will actually preclude predatory, discriminatory,
and unfair trade practices remains to be seen. The legislature had
more than just a passing interest in this issue. This is evidenced by
a provision which directs the Department of Agriculture and Con-
sumer Services to compile an annual report of complaints of viola-
tions of this law for presentation to the Speaker of the House and
the President of the Senate. Furthermore, Section 15 directs the
Division of Consumer Services to study the operation of this law
and its effect on gasoline prices. The Division is to then report its
recommendations to the legislature no later than November
1987.177
B. Summary of Florida's New Legislation
1. Below Cost Sales
The centerpiece of the new law is section four, the prohibition
against refiners selling motor fuel below cost at retail.' 71 To under-
stand the operation of this section, it is necessary to consider the
alleged abuse. As discussed above, refiners are directly operating
more and more retail motor fuel outlets in Florida. Jobbers con-
tend that it is common for refiners to sell motor fuel to their di-
174. FLA. S. JOUR. 402 (Reg. Sess. May 23, 1985) (Fla. CS for HB 690).
175. Ch. 85-74, 1985 Fla. Laws 429, 434.
176. Id. § 2, 1985 Fla. Laws at 429.
177. Id. § 15, 1985 Fla. Laws at 433.
178. Id. § 4, 1985 Fla. Laws at 433.
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rectly-operated stations at prices below those charged to their job-
bers and independent dealers. In most cases, and especially with
branded motor fuel (Texaco, Mobil, Chevron, Exxon, Amoco), job-
bers and independent dealers are required to purchase a minimum
quantity of a refiner's motor fuel under a long-term supply con-
tract, to accept the refiner's credit card, to sell only the refiner's
fuel, to exhibit the refiner's brand, and to follow the refiner's poli-
cies. 1 79 It is difficult, if not impossible, for a jobber or independent
dealer to compete for any length of time with its supplier that sells
at retail in the same market at prices less than the supplier sells to
the jobber or dealer. If the jobber and the independent dealer do
not meet their supplier's lower retail price, they will lose sales and
ultimately be forced out of the market. On the other hand, if they
meet the refiner's lower price and sell below their cost, substantial
losses will eventually force them out of business. Refiners obvi-
ously do not operate under the same profit and loss constraints as
do wholesalers and dealers. They can subsidize "losses" at their
retail outlets through profits earned in production and refining. In
the past, refiners have shown substantial losses in their motor fuel
marketing operations, which may be indicative of below cost sell-
ing.180 Continued subsidization of their retail marketing losses
through upstream production profits to the detriment of the job-
bers and dealers suggests predatory conduct by the refiners.
Section four requires refiners to sell at retail, at or above their
"cost." ' Obviously, the refiner's cost of fuel must be more than its
production cost. Therefore, the new law requires refiners to com-
pute cost beginning with the refiner's posted terminal price (whole-
sale price), plus taxes, inspection fees, and freight charges to its
retail location.182 Additionally, the cost attributable to a refiner's
labor at a particular retail outlet and a reasonable rental value for
the outlet must be included in the cost of motor fuel at a particu-
lar outlet. 83 Restricting refiners from below cost sales at retail
does not unduly tamper with consumer prices as the market re-
mains totally flexible for nonrefiners to sell below cost. It is fully
expected that this will happen from time to time as has been the
case in the past with temporary price wars. Although refiners are
prohibited from selling below cost, they are permitted to drop their
179. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
180. See ALLVINE, supra note 24, at 63; WILLIAMS, supra note 12, at 70.
181. Ch. 85-74, § 4, 1985 Fla. Laws 429, 430.
182. Id. § 3(7), 1985 Fla. Laws at 430.
183. Id.
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prices below cost to meet the equally low price of a competitor sell-
ing in the same market area. This means that the refiners' retail
outlets are not placed at a competitive disadvantage, only that
they are unable to engage in "first strike" predatory pricing.
2. Price Discrimination
Section five of the Act attempts to expand the restrictions im-
posed on price discrimination to preclude refiners from supplying
their directly-operated retail outlets with motor fuel at prices
lower than prices charged to jobbers or independent dealers com-
peting with those outlets. 84 Section five removes the distinction
between an intracompany transfer and a sale, and thereby requires
refiners to offer their jobbers or independent dealers the same
price as that charged to their directly-operated retail outlets in the
same market area. 185
3. Discriminatory Allocation of Fuel
Discriminatory allocations of motor fuel by refiners is addressed
in section six. 186 The legislature heard testimony that just as refin-
ers discriminate by way of price, they also discriminate against job-
bers and dealers by limiting or allocating the availability of motor
fuel to them while fully supplying their own directly-operated out-
lets. ' 7 This type of discrimination can be more ruinous than price
discrimination or below cost selling since it curtails or removes the
jobber's or independent dealer's source of supply from its sole sup-
plier. Thus, with many refiners intent on expanding their directly-
operated locations and reducing their jobber or independent dealer
locations, a prohibition on discriminatory allocations seems
appropriate.
Section six directly addresses the above-described discriminatory
practice. A refiner cannot favor its own retail outlets by way of
product availability at the expense of its jobbers or independent
dealers. Furthermore, a refiner cannot base future product alloca-
tions upon one jobber's or dealer's prior usage, unless the refiner
184. Id. § 5, 1985 Fla. Laws at 430.
185. Id. See § 3(3), defining "sale" to include any transfer of a motor fuel from a person
or entity to itself or to an affiliate. Price discrimination under the Robinson-Patman Act
requires two independent contemporaneous sales to customers competing in the same mar-
ket area. Since intracompany transfers by a refiner to its own retail outlet have not been
interpreted as sales, the federal law does not reach this obvious discrimination.
186. Id. § 6, 1985 Fla. Laws at 431.
187. See Gasoline Marketing Hearings, supra note 10, at 268.
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applies that same method to all purchasers, including the refiner's
own directly-operated outlets. ' 88
4. Coercive Contract Practices
Section seven addresses the relationship between refiners, job-
bers, other suppliers, and independent dealers.1 80 Due to the tre-
mendous economic advantage refiners and other suppliers have
over independent dealers, the dealers are often coerced into lower-
ing the retail price of their motor fuel. Additionally, dealers claim
they are coerced into modifying their contractual arrangements, in-
cluding station leases and motor fuel supply contracts, particularly
with regard to modification of the service station to a convenience
retail outlet. 190 Conversion of the station to a convenience retail
outlet is usually accompanied by substantial rent increases. The
result is most often economic failure of the dealer and, ultimately,
loss of the dealer's lease.
In section seven, the legislature specifically prohibits refiners
and other suppliers from fixing or maintaining retail motor fuel
prices at independent retail outlets and from coercing the purchas-
ers in this regard.191 While such actions are already prohibited
under federal law, this additional state remedy can only help stop
such practices. Also, section seven imposes a good faith or reasona-
ble business practice test on supplier-lessors when there is a modi-
fication of supply contracts with dealers or when leased premises
are materially altered.
5. Rebates
Refiner rebate programs were strenuously attacked by the job-
bers. They argued that refiners use these programs to favor their
directly-supplied dealers and to discriminate against their jobbers
and the jobbers' dealers. The most typical rebates mentioned were
volume rebates and rent rebates, whereby refiners allowed their di-
rectly-supplied dealers substantial discounts which result in these
dealers selling motor fuel at a lower price than their competitors.'92
This practice occurs typically in market areas where refiners sup-
plied jobbers without offering rebates. The jobbers were therefore
188. Ch. 85-74, § 6, 1985 Fla. Laws 429, 431.
189. Id. § 7, 1985 Fla. Laws at 431.
190. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
191. Ch. 85-74, § 7, 1985 Fla. Laws 429, 431.
192. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
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unable to pass on a rebate to their dealers who, in turn, were una-
ble to compete with the lower prices offered by the refiners' di-
rectly-supplied dealers.
Federal law does not prohibit this type of price discrimination
because it technically occurs at two different levels of distribu-
tion.'93 However, the impact is the same as if the discrimination
occurred at the same level of distribution. Section eight of the Mo-
tor Fuel Marketing Practices Act addresses this problem. It re-
quires all sellers of motor fuel to provide equal rebates, allowances,
or concessions to all purchasers purchasing for resale in the same
market area. Wholesalers are required to pass on refiner rebates to
their dealers.""'
6. Enforcement and Penalties
Section ten provides for public enforcement of the Act. 9 Com-
plaint investigations are conducted by the Department of Agricul-
ture and Consumer Services. The results of these investigations are
given to the Department of Legal Affairs, which prosecutes viola-
tions. Violators may incur civil penalties of up to $1 thousand per
violation, with each day of noncompliance deemed a separate vio-
lation. There is a $50 thousand cap on the civil penalty. Also, vio-
lators may be required to pay the state's legal fees if the court
deems it appropriate. 196
Section eleven authorizes private legal actions for injunctive and
declaratory relief as well as damages.197 A court may treble actual
damages and must award attorney's fees to a prevailing plaintiff. If
the defendant prevails, a court may award it attorney's fees. 98
There is a two-year statute of limitations on prosecutions by the
Department of Legal Affairs and a one-year statute of limitations
on private actions, except price discrimination actions, which have
a two-year limitation period."99
Like the federal and state antitrust laws, there is no violation
under the Act unless there is an injury to competition.'"0 Unlike
the antitrust laws, however, injury to competition means injury to
193. See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
194. Ch. 85-74, § 8, 1985 Fla. Laws 429, 431-32.
195. Id. § 10, 1985 Fla. Laws at 432.
196. Id.
197. Id. § 11, 1985 Fla. Laws at 432.
198. Id.
199. Id. § 12, 1985 Fla. Laws at 431.
200. Id. § 4(1), 1985 Fla. Laws at 430.
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a single competitor.20 1 Thus, the burden of proof required to show
a violation and prove damages under this Act should be substan-
tially less than the burden of proof in antitrust cases.
Pursuant to section fifteen, the Division of Consumer Services is
to compile a report of all complaints alleging violations of this law
and to present it to the Speaker of the House and the President of
the Senate no later than January 1 of each year.2 02 The Division is
also directed to study the operation of this law, to examine in de-
tail its effect on motor fuel prices, and to compare vertically inte-
grated pricing with horizontal distribution pricing. This study and
the recommendations of the Division are to be presented to the
Speaker and the Senate President no later than November 1987.203
Finally, the Florida divorcement law has been repealed, and pre-
sent or potential actions thereunder are rendered unenforceable by
sections thirteen and fourteen of the law.204
IV. ANALYSIS AND CRITICISM
Florida's Motor Fuel Marketing Practices Act should have a pos-
itive effect on both the petroleum industry and the consuming
public, thereby increasing overall consumer welfare. Contrary to
the views of its critics, the Act is not a minimum mark-up law or
state sanctioned price-fixing, which could raise prices at the pump
or a guarantee by the state that inefficient operators can remain in
the gasoline business. Rather, the Act represents a necessary addi-
tion to existing federal and state laws prohibiting unfair trade
practices. The Act's specific focus on prevalent practices in motor
fuel marketing should make the law more effective than the re-
pealed divorcement law. Section eleven of the Act reveals that the
legislature intended the Act to eliminate certain unfair practices in
order to encourage fair and unfettered competition in the market-
ing of motor fuel, which in turn should maximize benefits to the
consumers of Florida.20 5 Although the Act has several shortcomings
as a result of the compromise process, 206 it is consistent and har-
monious with national trade regulation policy. 0 7
201. Id. § 3, 1985 Fla. Laws at 430. " 'Competition' is defined as the vying for motor fuel
sales between any two sellers in the same market area." Id.
202. Id. § 15(1), 1985 Fla. Laws at 433.
203. Id. § 15(2), 1985 Fla. Laws at 433.
204. Id. §§ 13-14, 1985 Fla. Laws at 433.
205. Id. § 2, 1985 Fla. Laws at 429.
206. See supra notes 146-76 and accompanying text.
207. See supra notes 35-40 and accompanying text.
BELOW COST PETROLEUM SALES
Specifically, the Act will improve the ability of dealers and
wholesalers to compete fairly in the market with the refiners. Ac-
cordingly, more vigorous competition should benefit Florida's mo-
toring public, both in price and nonprice areas. The prohibition
against certain discriminatory practices is the key to giving the
dealers and wholesalers competitive parity with the refiners. For
example, the Act's discriminatory pricing provision extends to re-
finers' transfers to their company-operated retail stations. 0 8 This
means that a refiner operating a retail station on one corner cannot
supply its own station with gasoline at a price less than that same
refiner supplies an independent dealer or jobber operating a sta-
tion on the opposite corner. This eliminates one of the inherent
historical problems with the dual distribution system and closes a
loophole currently existing in the federal antitrust laws.
The prohibition against discriminatory rebates also eliminates a
serious abuse that has remained unchecked under the antitrust
laws. 109 As explained above, many of the major refiners have oper-
ated dealer rebate programs in a manner that indirectly discrimi-
nates against other retail dealers that sell the refiners' product. In-
variably, this places the retail dealer who purchases from a
wholesaler at a competitive disadvantage even though the whole-
saler purchases from the same refiner. In giving a substantial cash
rebate to the directly-supplied dealer, the refiner proportionately
lowers that dealer's net price paid for fuel. The Act eliminates this
practice and requires refiners to give rebates to all resellers (in-
cluding wholesalers) who compete in the same market.210 The Act
also requires that wholesalers pass the rebates on to their retail
dealers in the market, thereby ensuring competitive parity at the
retail level.211 Although refiners have threatened to eliminate
dealer rebate programs and other trade credit and trade discounts
to wholesalers, it is entirely too speculative at this point to deter-
mine whether this threatened action will materialize. Since all re-
finers do not use dealer rebate programs, those refiners who do
cannot eliminate these rebates if they want to keep their dealers
competitive unless they lower their dealer prices. A probable result
is that the rebate programs will continue but on more equitable
terms. Because of the competition between refiners who have re-
bate programs and those who do not, the rebate provision of the
208. Ch. 85-74, § 4(1), 1985 Fla. Laws 429, 430.
209. See O'Byrne v. Cheker Oil Co., 727 F.2d 159,164 (7th Cir. 1984).
210. See supra notes 192-94 and accompanying text.
211. Id.
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Act should not increase prices at the pump.
In the urban markets of the state, the prohibition against dis-
criminatory allocations will permit dealers and wholesalers to grow
with the market. This will prevent refiners with company-operated
retail units from squeezing out competing dealers and wholesalers
that purchase from these refiners. This, in turn, should increase
competition in the urban markets between refiners on the one
hand and independent dealers and wholesalers on the other.
There are many who believe that the Act's prohibition of below
cost sales does not go far enough. Since the Act only limits sales
made below cost by refiners operating their own units at retail,
some are concerned that this will not be effective to prevent the
below cost pricing prevalent in the market. This may or may not
be the case, but the intent of this provision was not to prevent
below cost pricing, per se, but only to prevent below cost pricing
that is predatory in nature and not the result of vigorous competi-
tion. By limiting the prohibition against below cost sales to refin-
ers, the legislature recognized that only this group can subsidize its
losses at the retail level from upstream profits earned in the pro-
duction and refining of crude oil. The Act operates as a measured
response aimed at the group with the greatest financial ability to
engage in predatory pricing. It also stops far short of setting mini-
mum retail price levels, which could result in higher prices.
The Act's definition of "refiner cost" is somewhere between a
marginal and average variable cost definition.212 This does not
force refiners to keep their prices at or above average total cost, as
do the Alabama and the Georgia statutes. More importantly, how-
ever, the exception which permits the refiner to sell below cost to
meet competition allows the refiners to remain competitive and
gives consumers the benefit of price wars. The refiner simply can-
not lead the market down. One of the final problems in measuring
refiner cost, however, is how to determine a reasonable rental value
of the retail outlet and to apportion that value to the part of the
premises attributable to the retail sale of motor fuel. This could be
difficult in the instances of convenience stores that sell gasoline.
One of the major differences between the Act and the existing
standards under both federal and state antitrust laws is the ele-
ment of injury to competition. Florida's Act does not require a spe-
cific showing of intent to injure competition. Rather, the act of in-
juring competition itself provides the presumed intent to
212. See supra note 52.
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accomplish the result.2 13 Hence, the unfair practices delineated in
the Act are unlawful only when the effect is to injure competition.
Moreover, "competition" is defined as competition between two
persons, and means that an aggrieved plaintiff can satisfy the "in-
jury to competition" element by showing injury to himself, as a
single competitor.1 This should remove a major proof obstacle
and eliminate one of the impediments to private enforcement ac-
tions that exist under federal antitrust laws.
A potential. criticism of the Act is that it will promote expensive
and unnecessary litigation. This admittedly undesirable effect is
checked in two ways. First, the legislature provided that isolated
and inadvertent incidences shall not be a violation of the Act.215
This should keep the crybabies out of court. Further, the Act gives
courts discretion to award attorney's fees to a prevailing defen-
dant. Although the Act does not provide specific guidelines, an
award should be made where there is a lack of a substantial basis
for bringing the action.2 16 This should have a chilling effect on friv-
olous actions.
Overall, the enforcement scheme is intended to promote volun-
tary compliance. It is doubtful that the Department of Legal Af-
fairs will actively enforce the Act except in the most egregious cir-
cumstances. The potential risk of substantial civil fines should also
prove a deterrent, but the primary enforcement tool will be private
treble damage actions. This too will have a strong deterrent effect.
Allowing plaintiffs to litigate potential claims in state court should
lessen the expense and delay of litigating under the federal anti-
trust laws.
With respect to the dealer provisions, there was much sentiment
on behalf of the dealer organizations and others that the provisions
of the Act stop short of correcting the main evils identified by the
dealers. Although there is some merit to this claim, the Act does
give the dealers some relief.217 Although the federal antitrust laws
currently prevent resale price maintenance through a supplier's use
of coercive tactics, 18 the Act's prohibition of this practice not only
provides an alternative state remedy to the dealer, but also sends a
213. See supra notes 200-01 and accompanying text.
214. Id.
215. Ch. 85-74, § 4(1), 1985 Fla. Laws 429, 430.
216. Id. § 11(4), 1985 Fla. Laws at 433.
217. See id., § 7, 1985 Fla. Laws at 431.
218. Arnott v. American Oil Co., 609 F.2d 873 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 918
(1980).
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clear message to refiners that such practices will not be tolerated in
Florida. Further, the dealers received additional relief from unrea-
sonable modifications of their contracts and unreasonable rent in-
creases and from forced conversions of leased premises. This gives
the dealer some leverage in negotiating its contracts with refiners
and forces refiners to justify decisions affecting the manner in
which the leased premises are operated.
In sum, the true impact of the Act will not immediately be
known. It is too soon for public and private enforcement actions to
have been concluded and, therefore, to be assessed as to their ef-
fectiveness. Public enforcement by the Department of Agriculture
must await the Department's education of its field investigators
about the provisions of the Act. Finally, it is too early to measure
the refiner's response to several key provisions of the Act, espe-
cially those addressing below cost sales and unlawful rebates. The
Act should still go a long way toward alleviating the harm occur-
ring in the petroleum marketplace in Florida today.
